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Introduction
The current discussion about restructuring the European banking sector is centred around the introduction of a separate, specialist banking system. The most prominent contribution to this discussion is the European Commission's Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector, whose report was published in October 2012 (Liikanen et al. (2012) ). The overarching goals of introducing a separate banking system are a more stable financial system, an increase in the security of deposits and a reduction of public financial support needed to stabilise financial institutions. These goals were motivated by the developments of the financial crisis in the late 2000s. In a separate banking system, the particularly risky investment banking activities are separated from the other business areas of a universal bank (particularly from deposit banking, payment transactions and lending to individuals as well as businesses) and are assigned to a separate investment bank. This is designed to create two largely separate banking cycles. According to the Liikanen Report, both retail and investment banks will have to comply with regulatory capital requirements. In a separate system, however, investment banks would no longer be able to benefit (directly or indirectly)
from the retail bank's deposit banking business. A potential advantage concerning refinancing costs, namely a lower risk premium due to possible government intervention in times of crisis, would also be eliminated. After all, investment banks, as opposed to retail banks, are to receive no or only very limited government support during a financial crisis.
The idea of two separate banking cycles is not recent. In 1933, the US introduced a separate, specialist banking system through the Glass-Steagall Act, in response to the Great Depression. It was designed to avoid conflicts of interest between different banking activities of a universal bank and thus to protect customers. This banking system was watered down over the years and finally resolved in the 1990s. Beforehand, influential studies had documented that the danger stemming from conflicts of interest in universal banks had been overestimated in the 1920s (Kroszner/Rajan (1994) , White (1986) ). Studies on the period after 1987, when important deregulation measures were taken, reach similar conclusions (e.g., Gande et al. (1997) , Gande et al. (1999) , Mullineaux (2002) , Focarelli et al. (2011) ).
The aim of our study is to provide a comprehensive overview of the different separation approaches currently discussed, to question existing ideas and to present the repercussions of a separation for the German banking system and the stability of the banking sector.
The analysis is structured as follows. Chapter II describes and discusses current proposals for the introduction of a specialist banking system. Building up on this, in Chapter III, we discuss the repercussions of the introduction of such a system for Germany and analyse whether a separate banking system can improve the stability of the banking sector in general.
Chapter IV concludes.
Overview of the Current Reform Proposals
The introduction and design of a separate banking system is the topic of public and academic debate. Two options are already being implemented: the so-called Volcker Rule (included in the Dodd Frank Act) in the US and the proposals by the Vickers Commission in the UK. The latter is based on a 2009 OECD proposal, which is centred on so-called Non-
Operating Holding Company Structures (NOHC)
. This approach has also been considered by the Liikanen Report. The current approaches will be discussed in this chapter.
OECD proposal 3
In 2009 with an eye to the too-big-to-fail issue. The authors come to the conclusion that the proposals on a financial market reform collated by the G-20 at the 2009 financial summit in Pittsburgh and designed to increase financial market stability (esp. Basel III) are not sufficient. An NOHC structure proposes the operative separation of individual business areas of a (universal) bank under one umbrella company. Each legally independent entity has its own capital base which is a priori non-transferrable between the entities. Only the umbrella company is entitled to borrow on the capital market and can then invest these resources in the different entities, but it is not entitled to pursue banking activities itself. Excluding customer deposits from liability for losses of the investment bank addresses the too-big-to-fail problem. This type of separation would also facilitate the liquidation of an insolvent business branch. Each business unit has to develop its own "living will" for a potential insolvency and joint and several liability among the separated business units is excluded.
This means that there shall be no intermeshing of staff that could water down the separation, so that every entity has its own board of management, supervisory board and reporting.
Despite a complete legal separation, the holding company is allowed to fulfil tasks (e.g. IT and Marketing) which may be used by all entities in order to create economies of scale and scope.
Vickers Commission and White Paper
In June 2010, the UK government set up the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) chaired by the former Governor of the Bank of England, Sir John Vickers. The Commission's goal was to create a stable and efficient banking system and secure people's savings deposits. To achieve this goal, business units handling deposits were to be strictly shielded from other banking areas ("ring fencing"). The proposal was published in late 2011 and served as the basis for a draft law published by the UK government in June 2012 as a White
Paper. The White Paper included many of the recommendations made by the Commission.
The government seeks to pass this law by the end of the current legislature in May 2015 and fully implement it by 2019. The draft law calls for a ring fence between the economically relevant banking areas -traditional retail banking with deposit banking and lending -and the areas that are less important for the whole economy. Passing through losses in the investment banking branch to retail banking would thus become impossible. Client deposits under a certain threshold are to be assigned to the separated business unit (White Paper (2012) ).
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The Vickers Commission categorises financial services as: (1) exclusively permissible for ring-fenced banks, (2) prohibited for ring-fenced banks, and (3) permitted financial services which may be offered by ring-fenced banks (Sachverständigenrat (2011), p. 161). The White Paper (2012) stipulates the following rules for ring-fenced banks:
1. Higher capital requirements apply in a ring fence than for other banking activities. A tier-1 capital ratio of 10 to 13% is planned, as well as an overall capital ratio (tiers 1 and 2) of up to 17% for systemically important banks (SIBs). Outside of the ring fence, the -lowerBasel III requirements apply.
2. The leverage ratio 5 is set at 3%, acknowledging the respective Basel III criteria as sufficient.
3. Lending to other banks or financial institutions outside of the ring fence (e.g. insurers) is prohibited.
4. Transactions between the ring-fenced entity and the remaining financial institutions are limited and have to be treated as business with third parties in terms of risk management and financial supervision.
5. Financial services for clients outside of the European Economic Area (EEA) may not be carried out.
As in the OECD structure, the two business areas are to be separated legally, i.e. each entity has to set up its own reporting, board of management and supervisory board. In contrast to the fixed capital base, the entities may transfer capital between the different business areas, as long as each entity complies with its specific capital requirements. These measures are planned to enter into force in 2019. Therefore, its effects will only become visible later on.
Discussions on Vickers and the White Paper
There have been mixed responses from the UK financial industry. Some assume that diversification stemming from different business areas may decrease and thus make the overall banking business riskier. On the other hand, such a law is not expected to make banks and other financial institutions leave the financial centre of London, as the investment industry there would not be regulated more strictly than in other financial centres. Commission's proposal might have an adverse effect on international reform efforts towards a uniform prudential supervision through a "geographic splitting of financial institutions". This 5 The leverage ratio is essentially the ratio between tier-1 capital to the bank's non-risk-weighted assets. 6 A Financial Times (2011) article assumes that the location choice for financial activities is made first and foremost based on long-term business strategies and that, therefore, a more profound change in business models would have to take place to motivate a change in location. This assumption meets the results of Lang (2012) , who analyses determinants of location attractiveness of financial centres.
is because according to the Vickers Report, only private customers located in the UK have to be ring-fenced; for all other clients in the European Economic Area, ring-fencing is merely an option. Therefore, retail banks outside of the EEA can also remain outside of the ring fence.
The Vickers Commission therefore hampers global efforts to create a supranational supervisory authority (Sachverständigenrat (2011)).
Volcker Rule
The Volcker Rule is part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec- 1. "Short-term" is defined as a holding period of less than 60 days. Proprietary trading with US bonds or bonds of companies or institutes with close links to the government is not subject to this prohibition. Providing liquidity for customers (market-making) and hedging are permitted.
2. Assets considered to be "very risky" are private equity funds and hedge funds. In order to limit funds financed by banks, banks may only hold a maximum of 3% of fund volume and may only invest a maximum of 3% of their tier-1 capital in such financial instruments.
3. Mergers which would result in a retail bank with a total balance of more than 10% of the aggregate US banking market are prohibited.
Discussions on the Volcker Rule
Chow/Surti (2011) fear the rise of problems for the regulatory categorisation of business areas. According to the authors, the definition of permitted hedging activities is too vague, making it almost impossible to distinguish these from prohibited activities. The authors also fear a potential shift of risks to shadow banks, where they would be difficult to monitor.
However, new laws and regulations will take years to show their effect even after complete implementation, due to the high number of transition periods of up to 144 months (Liikanen (2012) ). These transition periods are conditional on the size of a bank and its involvement in risky assets. Larger banks are granted longer transition periods. Another point of critique is that the Volcker Rule could limit companies' supply of capital market products and render market making more expensive (e.g. Duffie (2012) (2012)).
The Volcker Rule does create new requirements for mergers in order to limit the size of individual banks relative to the financial system. However, the intended cluster risk reduction only applies to new cases and does not affect the size of existing financial institutions. The
Volcker Rule does not limit business activities of financial services providers that have a different legal form than banks, which could be an advantage for insurance companies and private equity firms (The Economist (2010)).
The Liikanen Report
When the ICB's detailed proposal and the introduction of the Volcker Rule in the US took shape, the EU Commission for the Internal Market and Services instructed an Expert Group ("Liikanen Group") in early 2012 to find a solution tailored to the needs of the EU. In early October 2012, the Liikanen Group submitted its final report. Similar to Altunbas et al.
(2011), they found that "no particular business model fared particularly well, or particularly poorly in the financial crisis" (Liikanen et al. (2012) , p. 99). Instead, the Liikanen Group found that the causes of the financial crisis were "excessive risk-taking -often in trading highly-complex instruments [. . .] -and excessive reliance on short-term funding" (Liikanen et al. (2012) , p. 99).
In order to counteract these developments, the framework set by Basel III and CRD III/IV are to be supported by stricter capital and risk management requirements. Furthermore, the expert group proposes to make efficient consolidation plans compulsory, to introduce "bail-in" instruments 10 for a stronger loss share of private investors, as well as to secure property investments with more capital. In addition, supervisory authorities are to be strengthened by easier supervision, stricter risk management regulations, and the introduction of effective 10 A "bail-in" instrument triggers the conversion of debt into equity in a previously defined crisis scenario.
sanctions. The rules governing the payment of bankers should furthermore be tightened. The greater share of variable pay stipulated by CRD III is to include more "bail-in" instruments so that the management has a share in losses. This is considered a crucial step in building up the public's confidence in a just financial system. The group of authors in Liikanen et al. (2012) comes to the conclusion that separating risky trading activities in a separate banking unit ("investment bank") is necessary to guarantee financial stability. The Liikanen Group proposes two alternative ways to separate commercial and investment banks:
Avenue 1
This option calls for the introduction of an additional, non-risk-weighted capital buffer for all banks whose investment activities exceed a certain threshold. The dimensions of this buffer depend on the volume of trade activities. A higher capital buffer is also considered for banks with a high share of deposit financing in order to further protect retail banks from the higher risk incurred from investment banking activities. In a second step, these banks' "restructuring and liquidation plans" have to be scrutinised by the supervisory authorities. In these plans, banks are to explain how they would prevent losses in the investment branch from spilling over to the retail branch (this corresponds to the OECD proposal's "living will") in case of a crisis. If the supervisory authorities deem the banks' plans to be insufficient, a legal separation of investment banking from retail banking becomes compulsory. This scrutinization basically requires a banking union with the same supervisory rules across countries (level playing field). Otherwise, there would be national incentives to treat this issue differently, which could lead to differences in the attractiveness of location (see Lang (2012) ).
As in the OECD proposal, a separation of banking units makes it impossible to finance investment banking with deposits or to move capital between the two entities (Blundell-
Wingall et al. (2009)).

Avenue 2
This approach does not require previous scrutinization by the supervisory authorities for a separation of investment activities. Rather, exceeding a certain numerical threshold for a bank's investment business calls for a separation. The Liikanen Report discusses both a complete separation of investment activities and the option to only separate the volume exceeding the threshold. 11 As in Avenue 1, the bank will be separated into two legally independent banking units, which, similar to the British system, have to have their own management and reporting and which are not allowed to transfer capital between each other. One exception is a retail bank in distress. Here, the investment unit can help out with capital. However, capital requirements have to be observed, which require an additional capital buffer for the investment unit (as in Avenue 1). Furthermore, retail banking entities are not allowed to be owner or property of an internal or external investment banking unit.
In both Avenues, the Liikanen Group proposes these numerical thresholds: Investment activities must not exceed (1) a volume of 15 to 25% of the total balance sheet or (2) a total maximum value of 100 billion euro.
According to Liikanen not all investment banking activities are affected by a separation but only the riskiest. Particularly proprietary trading with securities and derivatives and other activities in the securities and derivatives markets are to be separated. The latter affects all trading positions in market making. Trading activities within a bank's own asset and liability management are an exception. The report lists further activities that should be part of a separate investment unit, 12 as well as those which should continue to be allowed in the remaining banking unit, but which have to be restricted nonetheless.
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If the supervisory authorities require a splitting of the bank, the two resulting units can continue operation as two legally independent entities or can be bundled underneath the umbrella of a holding (NOHC structure). Bundling can evoke economies of scale and scope.
However, defining numerical thresholds will be very difficult and require continuous scrutinization. The Liikanen Group assumes that refinancing banks will become more costly, which could in turn, together with less diversification options, make banking products more expensive.
Discussion on the Liikanen proposal
One may assume that defining thresholds for the permitted share of investment activities may be an incentive for banks to fulfil the (same) return expectations with riskier activi-11 See Liikanen et al. ((2012), p. 98) . The latter option is designed to consider diversification benefits. However, whether a separation of only those investment activities exceeding the threshold can result in an independent, surviving entity is doubtful. 12 Loans and brokerage for hedge funds, off-balance-sheet business and investments in private equity. 13 Lending business with companies, foreign trade financing, consumer credit business, mortgages, inter-bank loans, shares in loan syndication, securitization concerning refinancing, wealth management and asset management, as well as arrangements with money market funds.
ties. This means a bank could stay below the threshold but yield an average return which, before, it was only able to reach by exceeding the threshold. 
Effects of the Proposals
Effects of a separate banking system on the stability of the banking sector
Investment banks are spun off so that, in a financial crisis, the taxpayer only has to pay for saving (part of) the retail banks, while investment banks, which are deemed economically less important can go bankrupt. 15 Suppliers of equity and debt capital to investment banks could thus lose their entire capital invested. The risk premia they demand should rise accordingly. The higher price for capital should, ceteris paribus, lead to a slower growth of the investment banking unit.
A further advantage of a separate banking system as pointed out by the Liikanen Report is that the banking system's structure becomes less complex and that higher transparency makes banking supervision easier. These arguments support the introduction of a separate banking system in order to stabilise the banking sector. Empirical research is less conclusive, but there are indications that universal banks with a relatively low share in investment banking are less prone to crises than their alternative of pure investment and retail banks.
There is clear evidence from research that investment banking is a particularly risky part of the banking business (see e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt/Huizinga (2010)). All empirical studies included in the following part of this chapter agree on this topic. et al. (2010) reach the conclusion that significantly negative effects could originate in hedge funds in times of crisis, which could move from investment banks (as the transmission channel) to retail banks and even the insurance sector. 16 The study identifies hedge funds as one of the central risk factors for systemic crises and shows that investment banks would be adversely affected by them but could also function as transmission channel to other areas of the financial sector. The results of the study could be interpreted as that a separation of investment banks from retail banks and insurers could significantly reduce the systemic risk stemming from hedge funds. A separate banking system would leave most of the risk stemming from hedge funds in investment banks. 15 The Sachverständigenrat ((2011), p. 161-162) voices its doubts about this in its brief analysis of separate banking systems based on the Vickers Report. It assumes that the threat of not providing government means to rescue investment banks in times of crisis will be difficult to put into practice. The prevention of a systemwide domino effect in the banking sector by ring-fencing banks is also deemed improbable. 16 The study analyses the US financial sector and uses daily data for the period from Their main finding is that a small share in investment banking activities (characterised by an emphasis on "non-interest business" and a larger share in short-term financing through the capital market) generates diversification benefits in the business model. income, while this connection cannot be found in large banks (see Köhler (2012) ).
Adams
-A main source of systemic risk in the financial sector seems to be hedge funds.
Investment banks serve as a transmission channel for risks to other areas of the financial sector (retail banks, insurance companies) (see Adams et al. (2010) ).
These results rather speak against the introduction of a pure separate banking system, but in favour of strictly limiting the influence of investment banking on the universal bank.
The Liikanen Report's Avenue 2 takes account of this fact by proposing a compulsory separation into investment bank and retail bank only above a threshold of 15 to 25% (Liikanen et al.
( (2012), p.101)). This would permit a significant participation in investment banking without requiring a separate investment bank. However, under Avenue 2, a positive diversification effect would almost be eliminated after a complete separation of the investment bank. 21 A possible consequence is reduced stability for both retail bank and investment bank.
This supports the introduction of Avenue 1 in combination with a stricter limit on a bank's share in investment banking. However, the Liikanen Report does not make clear suggestions for the allocation of banking activities to the two separated entities. According to Liikanen et al. ((2012) , p.98), it would be possible to only transfer those investment activities to the investment banking unit which exceed the 15-25% threshold. This would at least constitute a diversification advantage for the retail bank.
Empirical studies such as Altunbas et al. (2011) and Köhler (2012) use their empirical findings to argue that the main factors for systemic risk are strong credit growth, insufficient equity and a large share of short-term capital market financing. These risk factors are already considered in the new Basel III regulations, e.g. through the introduction of higher regulatory capital requirements, the anti-cyclical capital buffer or the minimum liquidity requirement.
The discussion on separate banking systems does not significantly touch upon these main risk factors and therefore seems to not play a central role in the debate on how to reduce systemic risk.
Effects on the German banking structure
Under the Volcker Rule, banks wishing to continue using the deposit-guarantee scheme and access to central bank resources have to either legally separate their investment business 21 Diversification benefits could still arise in this case because not all investment banking activities have to be transferred to the investment bank. According to the Liikanen Report, proprietary trading and other trading activities are to be transferred while M&A business, which is not systemically important, may remain in the retail bank.
or limit its operation in compliance with regulation. Since customer investments continue to be permitted, however, they would still be able to offer a wide range of products without a spin-off of their investment banking unit. Nevertheless, the Volcker Rule has to be viewed as that cooperation between savings banks and regional banks will continue to be possible. 
Conclusion for Economic Policy and Banking Regulation
This section presents the main findings of our study. A separate banking system is not necessary to prevent conflicts of interest within the banks. This is the result of many empirical studies analysing banks' business policy before the introduction of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 against the backdrop of the separate banking system in the US which was abolished in the late 1990s. These studies show that there were no systemic differences between the issuing activities of a universal bank and a pure investment bank. A separate banking system reduces potential banking business diversification: A strict separation of investment banks from retail banks would diminish useful diversification effects, which could cause both retail banks and investment banks to become less stable.
The separation of investment bank and retail bank as proposed by the Liikanen Report takes account of potential diversification benefits of the universal bank by introducing thresholds. Since a separation is only recommended for a minimum participation in investment banking of 15 to 25%, diversification benefits could still be reached by combining a smaller share of investment banking with a larger share of retail banking. However, diversification benefits from the banking business would largely be lost, especially for the investment bank, should a strict separation (Avenue 2) occur.
Alternatives for a further regulation of investment banking
The aim of separate banking systems is to remove the highly risky investment banking activities from the universal bank and manage it as a separate entity. This constitutes a strong intervention in existing banking structures and raises the question whether the risks stemming from investment banking could be minimised adequately with less effort. This section pre-sents two alternatives geared towards reducing the systemic risk stemming from investment banks. The general idea is to make existing 23 or additional capital requirements conditional on the size of the investment business. Such a component of regulatory equity could be defined depending on the size of a bank's participation in investment banking relative to the overall bank size. 24 This measure could be compulsory for all banks with a certain participation in investment banking or, alternatively, only for systemically important banks (e.g. global systemically important banks (G-SIB) or domestic systemically important banks (D-SIB)). Since proprietary trading constitutes a particularly risky part of investment banking, this equity requirement could also be defined as dependent on the size of a bank's proprietary trading.
A second alternative would be to link additional regulatory equity for banks to the size of a bank's hedge fund business. A good reason for this alternative is that lending to hedge funds is a main influencing factor for systemic risk stemming from investment banks. Contrary to the Volcker Rule, this regulation would not limit the maximum participation rate but would stipulate capital requirements and therefore the price for lending to hedge funds.
An advantage for banking supervision would be that banks cooperating with hedge funds are easier to regulate than hedge funds themselves, which in turn means that hedge funds could (indirectly) be regulated more easily. A disadvantage for banks would be that they would have to bear the burden (and costs) instead of hedge funds, which are more difficult to grasp.
These two alternatives would avoid the effort-intensive splitting of banks, which would also entail unforeseeable consequences for banks' business models. Nevertheless, these two approaches could set incentives to reduce investment banking participation. However, there already are comprehensive regulation reforms (Basel III, EU Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers 25 ) whose repercussions would have to be known before introducing new measures. 23 As, for example, the capital conservation buffer or the systemic buffer. 24 As Avenue 1 of the Liikanen Report already calls for an additional minimum equity ratio based on the nonrisk-weighted investment banking activities this idea could be easily integrated in the proposal of the Liikanen group. 25 
